What are the differences between the left and right in Central America today?. A debate about the attitudes of political elites and the nature of democracy in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala by Martí i Puig, Salvador
1 
 
What are the differences between the left and right in Central America today? A 
debate about the attitudes of political elites and the nature of democracy in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala 
 
Authors: Salvador Martí i Puig and Salvador Santiuste Cué   
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the opinions and attitudes of the main parliamentary 
groups in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala on two crucial subjects: democracy 
and its institutions; and, the relationship between the market and the State. With regard 
to democracy and its institutions, the paper explores the current perceptions/opinions of 
political elites on the left and the right with regard to these issues, in countries that 
recently achived democracy after suffering bloody civil wars. Secondly, the paper 
outlines the agreements, disagreements, as well as the changes that have taken place 
within these political factions which, up to today, continue to claim opposing views.    
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Resumen: El presente trabajo analiza las opiniones y actitudes que los principales 
grupos parlamentarios de Nicaragua, El Salvador y Guatemala tienen con respecto a dos 
temas cruciales: la democracia y sus instituciones, y la relación entre Estado y mercado. 
Con ello, se persigue un doble fin. Primero, descubrir cuáles son las percepciones que, 
con respecto a ambos temas, tienen en la actualidad las elites políticas de izquierda y 
derecha que en estos tres países alcanzaron la democracia tras sufrir cruentas guerras 
civiles. Y segundo, reseñar las discrepancias y convergencias, así como los cambios que 
se han producido en unas opciones políticas que, todavía hoy, se siguen 
autoproclamando antagónicas.   
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Centroamérica.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this text is to analyse and compare the differences and similarities in the 
perceptions/opinions of parliamentary elites about the political systems in which they 
are involved. The elites studied here belong to the most relevant left- and right- wing 
groups in the parliaments of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala1: the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista 
(PLC) in the case of Nicaragua; the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional 
(FMLN) and the Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA) in El Salvador; and, lastly, in 
Guatemala the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), the Partido de 
Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG). We believe 
that this study is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, none of these three countries had 
experienced liberal democracy until the 1990s. Secondly, just two decades ago these 
political groups, which today share the same institutions, were fighting each other in 
ruthless civil wars. 
 
The revolutionary uprisings in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the 1970s were the 
result of the confrontation between traditional agrarian societies and popular demands 
for social justice. In Guatemala, the return of guerrilla insurgence in the same decade 
(although noticeably less intense and more isolated than in the two neighbouring 
countries) was the result of the growth of the left in the region. The rapid social changes 
that took place during the 1960s and 1970s coincided with an extraordinary u-turn in the 
role of the Catholic Church, which went from being a pillar of the established order to 
an agent of popular mobilisation. Reformists demanded a democratic renovation of 
authoritarian political systems which were dominated by the landholding elite.  
However, in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala this reformist wave was dismantled 
by repression which led to a polarisation of politics, the rise of the revolutionary left and 
the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. When the wars ended, at the start of the 1990s, Central 
America had undergone a political transformation. Although the revolutionaries were 
only victorious in Nicaragua (and only for a short period, due to the implacable hostility 
of the United States), the region‟s traditional elites were forced to accept democratic 
political institutions in exchange for the demobilisation of the armed left. In exchange 
for democracy, the armed groups sought social reform via the ballot box rather than 
thorugh armed revolution. The transitional pact in El Salvador was explicit and took the 
form of agreements negotiated between the State and the revolutionary left. In 
Nicaragua, the situation was the other way round but the result was similar: the 
revolutionary government of the Sandinistas was forced by the armed counter-
revolutionary forces to make democratic concessions 2 (LeoGrande, 2001). 
 
 
Perceptions about a “democracy” that arrived by mistake  
 
Before observing and analysing the perceptions held by the political elites of El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala about democracy, it is important to note that this 
was not the real cause for which they fought. For the left - grouped around the FSLN, 
the FMLN and the URNG respectively – the desired goal had always been revolution 
and social, economic and political transformation.  In general, these groups were more 
enthusiastic about the Cuban regime than about any other established in the 
subcontinent. On the other hand, the right – led by the Creole oligarchy and supported 
unconditionally by the US administration – stuck to an authoritarian and elitist mindset, 
3 
 
without ruling out (until the end of the 1980s) a somewhat renovated return to the “old 
order”. Bearing this situation in mind, it is no exaggeration to state that the new liberal 
democratic regimes that were born out of the respective wars did not completely satisfy 
any of the groups that had formerly been involved in these wars.  However, after the 
1990s, things seem to have changed, as can be seen in the data presented here from 
interviews conducted with parliamentarians in all three countries  
 
 
Table 1. Evaluation of Democracy as a Form of Government * Political Party 
 Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
PLC FSLN ARENA FMLN PAN FRG URNG 
Democracy is preferable to 
other forms of government 
31 21 24 22 12 38 3 
100% 84% 100% 100% 92.3% 86.4% 75% 
In contexts of crisis, an 
authoritarian government can 
be preferable 
0 2 0 0 1 6 0 
0% 8% 0% 0% 7.7% 13.6% 0% 
Don‟t know/don‟t answer 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 
0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 
Total 31 25 24 22 13 44 4 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Representative democracy as a form of government has been accepted unilaterally by 
the majority of the political elites of the three countries, as can be seen in Table 1 
(above). This is the case in Nicaragua, where there are no significant differences 
between the positions of the Liberal and Sandinista deputies in terms of rating 
democracy as the preferable form of government. The same is true in the case of El 
Salvador, with even more convincing evidence, as none of the interviewees thought that 
an authoritarian government could be preferable. Only in the case of Guatemala, and 
more specifically within the FRG, is there a minority which questions democracy in 
times of crisis, which underlines the existence of sectors within Ríos Montt‟s party  
which still have reservations about representative institutions despite the fact that, when 
the interview was carried out, having achieved power thanks to these very institutions. 
 
Although the reasons that can explain such a complete agreement among the different 
political groups are often different in nature, it is clear that in the three countries there is 
a practically unanimous consensus about democracy as a desirable political regime.  
This consensus, as can be seen, includes both the left and the right. This is particularly 
important as it guarantees that - at least amongst the main political forces - there aren‟t 
any “conditional authoritarians” (Maravall, 1995); that is, groups that support 
authoritarian regimes given certain political, economic or social conditions.  
 
Yet the fact that democracy is seen to be the only legitimate form of government among 
the party elites does not guarantee its consolidation. If anything, it just increases its 
chances of survival. The commitment of political elites and parties to democracy is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the stability of a democratic regime 
(Mainwaring, 1992: 311). Furthermore, it is necessary that its institutions are solid and 
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efficient and, perhaps more importantly, that they are perceived as such by the principal 
political actors. 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how the elites value the institutions and 
fundamental mechanisms that organise representative democracy. For this reason, the 
second question of the interview referred to a key aspect of liberal democracy:  In the 
context of pluralism and wide party competition, to what extent do you agree – a lot, 
quite a bit, a little bit or not at all – with the statement that elections are always the best 
way to express political preferences? 
 
Table 2. Degree of agreement that elections are the best way to express political 
preferences * Political Party 
 Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
PLC FSLN ARENA FMLN PAN FRG URNG 
Not at all 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 
0% 4.2% 0% 17.4% 0% 0% 25% 
A little bit 0 4 0 11 1 2 1 
0% 16.7% 0% 47.8% 7.7% 4.5% 25% 
Quite a lot 3 10 9 3 3 14 2 
9.7% 41.7% 39.1% 13% 23.1% 31.8% 50% 
A lot 28 9 14 5 9 28 0 
90.3% 37.5% 60.9% 21.7% 69.2% 63.6% 0% 
Total 31 24 23 23 13 44 4 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Out of the replies obtained (see Table 2), it is necessary to point out the existence of a 
group of deputies in Nicaragua and within the FSLN (about 21% of the total) who only 
agree a bit or do not agree at all with the idea that elections are always the best way to 
express political preferences. On the other hand, this group is not found in the PLC 
since in this party all of the deputies agree with the statement either quite a bit or a lot.  
This does not mean that the FSLN disagrees with elections, bearing in mind that 72.9% 
of its deputies agree quite a bit or a lot, but there is a certain mistrust of elections per se.  
This lack of trust is also present in other left-wing groups in Central America. 
 
The “reservations” of a certain group within the FSLN about elections as a method of 
political expression can also be observed in the left of El Salvador and Guatemala, 
although in both cases the numbers are larger. In fact, in the case of the FMLN, the 
majority of its deputies (65.2%) agrees only a little bit or does not agree at all with the 
statement that elections are always the best method for expressing political preferences.   
This figure is particularly striking as elections are the means by which the interviewees 
obtained their seats. On the other hand, elections are widely accepted by ARENA, since 
all of its deputies agree either quite a bit or a lot. The case of Guatemala is more or less 
the same as that of El Salvador, since exactly half of the deputies of the former armed 
left (the URNG) does not agree that elections are the only way to express a society‟s 
political preferences. Once again, this contrasts with the wide acceptance among the 
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right–wing parties in Guatemala, which are clearly in favour of elections as the best 
method of political expression. 
 
Bearing this range of views in mind, it is necessary to ask: why does the left in all three 
countries, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, show reservations about elections 
as a mechanism of political expression? Perhaps part of the answer becomes clear when 
deputies are asked about the confidence they have in the last elections carried out in 
their respective countries. In this respect, the FSLN, the FMLN and the URNG show 
low levels of confidence in the elections (see Table 3), that were carried out during the 
1990s3. Thus, whereas the PLC, ARENA, PAN and FRG (which interestingly were the 
winners in the different presidential elections) have complete confidence in the elections 
that were carried out (with respective approval rates of 4.52, 4.60, 4.15 and 4.50 out of 
5), to a certain degree the FSLN, the FMLN and the URNG question their legitimacy 
(with respective approval rates of 2.28, 3.04 and 3.5). 
 
 
Table 3. Mean values of confidence in electoral processes 
Political Party Mean N Typical Deviation 
Nicaragua 
PLC 4.52 31 0.7 
FSLN 2.28 25 0.92 
El Salvador 
ARENA 4.60 24 0.5 
FMLN 3.04 22 0.79 
Guatemala 
PAN 4.15 13 1.34 
FRG 4.50 44 0.73 
URNG 3.50 4 0.58 
The mean values are obtained on a scale where 1 is minimum confidence and 5 is maximum confidence. 
 
 
Continuing the same theme, the deputies of the three countries were also asked about 
another basic aspect of liberal democracy which, undoubtedly, is fundamental for a 
regime to be considered democratic: political parties. Once again, the position of the 
deputies of the FMLN and the URNG were striking, since, in coherence with their 
opinion about elections, they did not show a particularly positive attitude about political 
parties as an instrument of democracy. This is a potentially worrying sign of their 
adherence to and compromise with the most representative institutions of liberal 
democracy. However, it is also possible that the explanation for this position is linked to 
the experience of both organisations which have been linked, for most of their history, 
to a rejection of the formal instruments of what they consider to be a “bourgeois 
democracy”.   
 
Now that we have evaluated the institutions and rules that form the basis of the type of 
government (such as elections and parties) it is also necessary to collect information 
about the confidence the party elites have in other institutions and actors that form the 
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basic framework of any political system. This will be shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6 for 
each country. 
 
Table 4. Nicaragua: Degree of confidence in the following institutions (%) 
 PLC FSLN 
 A lot Quite 
a lot 
A little 
bit 
Not at 
all 
A lot Quite 
a lot 
A little 
bit  
Not at 
all 
Judiciary 0.0 3.2 64.5 32.5 16 36 48 0.0 
Political Parties 25 37.5 37.5 0.0 4.0 52 36 8.0 
Business organisations 15.6 6.3 62.5 15.6 0.0 0.0 66.7 33.3 
Trades Unions 6.7 23.3 66.3 6.7 12.5 66.7 16.7 4.2 
Armed Forces 24.1 34.5 34.5 6.9 40 56 4.0 0.0 
Catholic Church 63.3 26.7 10 0.0 4.0 12 48 36 
Parliament 48.4 22.6 19.4 9.7 8.0 48 40 4.0 
President of the Republic 19.4 9.7 41.9 29 4.0 36 44 16 
Civil Servants 6.5 9.7 64.5 19.4 3.8 3.8 57.7 34.6 
Media 22.6 16.1 22.6 38.7 20 36 36 8.0 
Police 26.7 30 40 3.3 36 40 24 0.0 
Supreme Electoral Court 21.9 37.5 37.5 3.1 4.2 12.5 41.7 41.7 
 
In Nicaragua, there are important differences between the two most important parties 
with regard to confidence in specific institutions in the country. Thus, while for the PLC 
the institution which inspires most confidence is the Catholic Church (63.3%), for the 
FSLN it is the army (40%). There are also important differences between the parties 
when evaluating other institutions such as the judiciary, trades unions, parliament, the 
media and the Supreme Electoral Court. In this respect, among the institutions that 
inspire the PLC with least confidence are the judiciary (because of the number of 
conflicts generated over the decade as a result of many cases of corruption involving 
Arnoldo Alemán, the party‟s main leader, during his presidency, between 1996 and 
2001) and, paradoxically, civil servants. Equally important is the evident sensitivity 
within the PLC to business organisations which can be explained in part by the populist 
nature of the party and its mistrust of the business elite.  In fact, as was seen in the last 
elections of 2006, the party chooses options that are more politically and economically 
orthodox. On the other hand, the FSLN, has least confidence in business organisations, 
the Catholic Church (historically antagonistic to the Sandinistas during the revolution), 
the Supreme Electoral Council (which reinforces their aforementioned doubts about the 
electoral process) and civil servants.  
 
With regard to El Salvador, the FMLN‟s lower confidence in institutions is particularly 
striking. More specifically, it reflects high levels of mistrust amongst the left towards 
the judiciary, business organisations, political parties, and civil servants. In terms of 
ARENA, the most striking results – as to be expected – are the deputies‟ confidence in 
the President of the Republic (which has always been from that party) and in the 
Catholic Church. On the other hand, trades unions are the actors which merit the lowest 
levels of confidence, according to ARENA. 
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Table 5. El Salvador: Degree of confidence in the following institutions (%) 
 ARENA FMLN 
 
A lot  
Quite a 
lot 
A little 
bit 
Not 
at all 
A lot 
Quite a 
lot 
A little 
bit 
Not at 
all 
Judiciary 20.8 20.8 54.2 4.2 4.3 17.4 78.3 0.0 
Political Parties 4.3 56.5 34.8 4.3 4.3 17.4 73.9 4.3 
Business organisations 20.8 62.5 16.7 0.0 0.0 9.1 86.4 4.5 
Trades Unions 4.3 8.7 39.1 47.8 17.4 17.4 60.9 4.3 
Armed Forces 37.5 45.8 16.7 0.0 4.5 27.3 68.2 0.0 
Catholic Church 60.9 30.4 8.7 0.0 17.4 39.1 43.5 0.0 
Parliament 25 45.8 29.2 0.0 0.0 31.8 68.2 0.0 
President of the Republic 65.2 34.8 0.0 0.0 17.4 65.2 17.4 0.0 
Civil Servants 8.7 65.2 26.1 0.0 0.0 4.5 86.4 9.1 
Media 20.8 50 29.2 0.0 13.6 54.5 31.8 0.0 
Police 4.3 21.7 65.2 2.7 4.5 18.2 68.2 9.1 
 
In Guatemala, as is the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador, parties show different 
degrees of confidence in institutions. Nonetheless, in this case it is necessary to 
highlight the fact that none of the institutions evaluated is perceived by parties as highly 
trustworthy. Only the Catholic Church inspires relatively higher levels of confidence in 
the three parties4. However, confidence in the different institutions considered in the 
analysis varies in a roughly similar way between the left and right of the three countries, 
except in relation to very specific institutions (for example the judiciary) which have 
suffered from institutional conflicts in the recent past, or in institutions, such as the 
army, which held opposing positions to the parties during the armed conflict. This 
reflects the different positions adopted by the parties in the institutional and political 
context. Whereas the right adopts government positions, the left acts more like the 
opposition, at least up to the time of data collection. 
        
In this context, it is relevant to observe what party elites consider to be the “advantages 
of democracy” since even if they all consider themselves to be in favour of this type of 
government (as previously seen) it is obvious that they all have different benefits and 
advantages in mind (as can be observed in Table 6). And as was to be expected, two 
different conceptions of democracy emerge. One is linked to the left and focuses on the 
redistributive element, whereas the other is linked to the right and accentuates the 
protection of individual rights and freedoms. This leads us to conclude that there is an 
ideal of “social democracy” on the left and of “liberal democracy” on the right which 
prioritises the protection of freedom, understood as individual freedom (even though 
during the 1980s, the government respected neither freedoms nor rights (Martí 2004)). 
Finally, it is also evident that the Central American left has always aimed to expand the 
democratisation of society through the direct participation of social groups and not just 
via elections. 
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 Table 6. Main advantage of a democratic regime * Political party  
 Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
PLC FSLN ARENA FMLN PAN FRG URNG 
Economic growth 16.7% 26.9% 0% 17.4% 15.4% 18.2% 0% 
Protection of individual rights 
and freedoms 
43.3% 15.4% 59.1% 17.4% 30.8% 25% 0% 
Possibility of electing 
government 
10% 3.8% 9.1% 17.4% 15.4% 15.9% 25% 
Greater equality of opportunities 10% 7.7% 4.5% 13% 7.7% 11.4% 0% 
Respect for the human rights of 
minorities 
0% 3.8% 9.1% 0% 0% 6.8% 25% 
Possibility of participating in 
elections 
0% 11.5% 4.5% 4.3% 7.7% 9.1% 50% 
Better distribution of income 3.3% 23.1% 0% 21.7% 0% 9.1% 0% 
Peaceful resolution of conflicts 10% 3.8% 4.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Possibility of participating in 
politics through political parties 
6.7% 0% 9.1% 8.7% 15.4% 4.5% 0% 
Doesn‟t know/ doesn‟t answer 0 3.8% 0% 0% 7.7% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
31 24 24 23 13 44 4 
 
 
The differences between parties in the three countries are also evident when deputies are 
asked about what they consider to be the most relevant factor in the consolidation of 
their democracies (Table 7). Thus, in Nicaragua the PLC and the FSLN in general agree 
on identifying a consensus on the Constitution and basic institutions as the most 
relevant aspect of democratic consolidation. In El Salvador, even though both groups 
agree (about 17%) on the importance of reaching a such consensus, the deputies of 
ARENA consider electoral processes to be the priority (45.8%) whereas the FMLN 
values equally the importance of values of citizenship, economic agreements between 
the government, trades unions and business, and the lack of electoral fraud (likewise 
about 17%). Finally, in Guatemala the PAN priorities the development of free and clean 
elections (46.2%) as well as an independent constitutional court (38.5%). For its part, 
the FRG accentuates regional decentralisation (38.6%) and civilian control of the 
Armed Forces (20.5%), as is also the case with the URNG which further highlights the 
importance of economic agreements among government, trade unions and business.  
 
Table 7. Key factor for democratic consolidation * Political Party (%) 
 Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
PLC FSLN ARENA FMLN PAN FRG URNG 
Civilian control of the Armed 
Forces 
10% 4.2% 20.8% 13% 7.7% 20.5% 25% 
Consensus on the Constitution 
and basic institutions 
30% 37.5% 16.7% 17.4% 0% 11.4% 0% 
Decentralisation and regional 3.3% 16.7% 4.2% 13% 7.7% 38.6% 25% 
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democratisation 
Moderation of extremist parties 
on left and right 
6.7% 4.2% 4.2% 2.1% 0% 2.3% 0% 
Free and clean electoral 
processes 
16.7% 12.5% 45.8% 17.4% 46.2% 9.1% 0% 
Independent Constitutional 
Court 
30% 12.5% 0% 4.3% 38.5% 2.3% 0% 
Economic agreements between 
government, trades unions and 
businessmen 
0% 12.5% 0% 17.4% 0% 4.5% 25% 
Democratic citizen values 3.3% 0% 8.3% 17.4% 0% 11.4% 25% 
Doesn‟t know/doesn‟t answer 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
31 24 24 23 13 44 4 
 
 
The data collected up to this point offer some very clear conclusions on democracy and 
democratic institutions in Central America. Firstly, that democracy has been 
internalised by all of the deputies as the only form of government.  This does not rule 
out the existence of a certain anti-institutional trends on the left, which still has 
reservations about elections and political parties. This is particularly evident in the cases 
of the FMLN and the UNRG which are a lot more critical in their evaluations than the 
FSLN.  Perhaps it is because up until now, in contrast to the FSLN, they have gained a 
lot less out of these institutions. It is important to bear in mind that during the transition 
to democracy the FSLN started from a privileged position that was not enjoyed by the 
FMLN, nor the URNG.  It could also be because the latter two parties are faced with a 
much more complex competitive environment than that of the FSLN whose only real 
competitors, the liberals, act in a fragmented and undisciplined way. 
 
Yet a second question, related to the last table, also needs to be highlighted: the 
different opinions on the current state of democracy. For, while in El Salvador there is a 
great contrast between the diagnosis of the FMLN and ARENA, in Nicaragua there is 
quite a wide “consensus” between the PLC and the FSLN.  As a result, we can conclude 
that Nicaragua has a greater capacity to reach consensus and dialogue than El Salvador 
and Guatemala, given that there is an agreement within the two Nicaraguan parties on 
what has to be rethought or improved, even if afterwards they do nothing about it. 
 
 
The “State versus Market” debate 
 
Up until the second half of the 1980s most countries in Central America adopted a 
strategy of economic development that meant a considerable intervention by public 
authorities in the industrialisation process. This model was implemented in a variety of 
ways. In some countries the state maintained an important role in the economy, either 
through social-reformist policies, as in Costa Rica; or corporatist policies, as in 
Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. In other countries, authoritarian regimes managed the 
economy through monetary and free exchange policies, as in El Salvador or Guatemala. 
However, since the 1990s, the institutional and socioeconomic coordinates of all Central 
American countries have converged (Gomà, 1998).  This decade was marked, not only 
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by a wave of democratisations but also, on the economic level, by the discarding of 
statist and regulatory strategies in favour of neo-liberal policies inspired by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the opening up of economies to the outside 
world. 
 
It is important to note that these neo-liberal IMF inspired policies were implemented in the 
context of the “lost decade”, characterised by credit restrictions which resulted from the 
debt crisis and economic downturn. Their application meant a radical change from 
managing demand to stimulating supply; and from the creation of a public surplus to the 
consideration of private benefits as the only factor that created collective welfare. All of 
this was accompanied by the reduction of the margins of national manoeuvrability due to 
the rigid conditions imposed by the World Bank and the IMF.  However, the new neo-
liberal model not only affected economic policy but also brought with it the massive 
deregulation of the labour markets and the under-capitalisation of health services, 
education and social housing, without generating any type of compensatory program. After 
a decade, the main effect of these policies has been an increase in social inequality 
(Robinson, 2003). 
 
This process hit Central American countries exceptionally hard, particularly the countries 
considered here, which had recently suffered civil wars.  In the isthmus, the adjustments 
were implemented in an economic context where the average ratio of external debt to GDP 
was twice the Latin American average (74% compared to 36%) and where the terms of 
trade of the region‟s products decreased by 40% over the last 15 years. Moreover, policy 
implementation occurred during a post-war period characterised by the reconstruction and 
demobilisation of insurgent armies and the reduction of the Armed Forces (Cardenal and 
Martí, 1998). 
 
This recent history of yhe region being studied here makes it necessary to examine the 
debate about the role that the State or the market should exercise in society. Precisely for 
this reason, the second of the two basic axes of this investigation into the opinions of the 
political elites of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala collects information about how 
they conceive of the aforementioned relationship: how much market and how much state, 
and for what purpose. Therefore, the first question that needs to be analysed refers to the 
presence of the state and of the market (see Table 8). 
 
In the case of Nicaragua, there are important differences between both parties with 
regard to the intervention of the State in the economy. However, these differences are 
perhaps smaller than what we might expect. In any case, it can be said that the FSLN 
supports a greater state presence in the economy than the PLC. In comparison, the 
difference in El Salvador is very marked since the FMLN supports a greater state 
presence in the economy than ARENA, which is much more inclined than Nicaragua‟s 
PLC to reject state regulation of the economy. In Guatemala, both the PAN and the 
FRG opt for a free market, in contrast to the URNG which, like the FSLN, adopts a 
more intermediate position. 
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Table 8. State vs market 
Political Party Mean N Typical deviation 
Nicaragua 
PLC 3.96 31 1.05 
FSLN 2.86 25 0.88 
El Salvador 
ARENA 4.20 24 0.76 
FMLN 2.68 22 0.75 
Guatemala 
PAN 3.92 13 1.12 
FRG 3.82 44 1.30 
URNG 2.75 4 1.26 
The mean values are obtained from a scale in which 1 represents maximum state presence in the economy 
and 5 represents maximum regulation through the market itself.   
 
With regard to another key issue, that of taxation (see Table 9), the left – wing groups of 
the three countries believe that is necessary to burden capital and labour more than 
consumption. In this respect, 88% of the FSLN‟s deputies believe it necessary to 
establish taxes on capital and labour, whereas only 12% think it is necessary to tax 
consumption.  In the same way, although to a lesser extent, the FMLN supports (57%) 
taxes that are not intended to burden consumption, whereas the URNG proposes 
unanimously this type of fiscal policy.  However, this agreement among the different 
left-wing groups is not reflected among right-wing groups. While, the ARENA  
deputies prefer to burden consumption (45.8%) rather than capital and labour (37.5%),  
54.8% of deputies in the PLC would burden capital and labour, 22% consumption and 
another 22.6% prefer not to answer the question. Meanwhile, the FRG of Guatemala 
leans slightly towards burdening capital and labour (48.8%), unlike the PAN which 
prefers a fiscal policy centred on consumption (53.8%). 
 
 
Table 9. Type of tax burden * Political party 
 Nicaragua El Salvador Guatemala 
PLC FSLN ARENA FMLN PAN FRG URNG 
Taxes on capital and 
labour 
17 22 9 12 3 21 4 
54.8% 88% 37.5% 57.1% 23.1% 48.8% 100% 
Taxes on consumption 7 3 11 5 7 20 0 
22.6% 12% 45.8% 23.8% 53.8% 46.5% 0% 
Doesn‟t know/doesn‟t 
answer 
7 0 4 4 3 2 0 
22.6% 0% 16.7% 19% 23.1% 4.7% 0% 
Total 31 25 24 21 13 43 4 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The analysis of the survey data on opinions about economic ideology up to this point 
offers three conclusions that merit reflection. The first is that, an assessment of 
deputies‟ positions with regard to the relationship between State and Market and their 
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fiscal preferences seems to reveal a split within the right. One faction is elitist, neo-
liberal and enthusiastic about the market and the “opportunities” offered by 
globalisation. It is compreised of ARENA and the PAN (and from the elections of 2006 
onwards in Nicaragua by Eduardo Montealegre, who competed with the PLC under the 
Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense). The other faction is composed of the PLC, FRG and in 
El Salvador by the Partido de Conciliación Nacional. These parties defend a hierarchical 
society and “zero tolerance” policies on crime, as well as supporting a certain degree of 
protectionist corporatism using a nationalist and populist discourse. The second 
conclusion is that the left-wing parties agree basically on adopting positions in favour of 
state regulation of the market and fiscal policies that burden labour and capital rather 
than consumption, although if the data in the tables are considered closely, the 
responses of the parliamentarians of the FMLN, the FSLN and the URNG are not 
particularly “radical”, but rather more moderate5. The third conclusion is that, despite 
different positions adopted by left and right-wing groups (the latter with its two 
factions), the differences are not as extreme as one might expect, considering the 
region‟s historical antecedents.   
 
Where is politics at?  Some concluding reflections 
 
Now that the opinions of the political elites of the relevant left and right-wing groups in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala have been contrasted, we shall observe how the 
deputies consider themselves, their party and their opponents according to ideology, as 
seen in the three tables below. Using averages obtained from a scale of 1 (left) to 10 
(right), we can see enormous differences between parties from an ideological point of 
view (see Tables 10, 11 and 12). In this sense and in light of these data, the political 
systems seem to be rather polarised.  In Nicaragua, the deputies of the FSLN position 
themselves at 1.83, position the party at 1.69 and position their political opponent at 
9.19 on the scale; whereas the deputies of the PLC position themselves at 7, the party at 
7.11 and their political opposition at 1.81. In El Salvador, the deputies of the FMLN 
position themselves at 2.12, the party at 2.28 and their political opponent at 9.21; 
whereas the deputies of ARENA position themselves at 7.55, the party at 8.05 and their 
political opponent at 1.6. In Guatemala, the deputies of the URNG position themselves 
at 2.25, the party at 1.25 and their political opponents (the PAN and the FRG) in a 
centre right position. This is in contrast the FSLN and the FMLN which both locate 
their opponents on the extreme right.  
 
Table 10. Deputies‟ identification of their own ideological position 
Political Party Mean N Typ. Dev. 
Nicaragua 
PLC 7 31 2.14 
FSLN 1.83 25 1.07 
El Salvador 
ARENA 7.55 24 1.09 
FMLN 2.12 22 1.4 
Guatemala 
PAN 6.17 13 1.47 
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FRG 5.48 44 1.53 
URNG 2.25 4 0.96 
The averages are obtained based on a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. 
 
 
Table 13. Deputies‟ identification of their party‟s ideological position 
Political Party Average N Typ. Dev. 
Nicaragua 
PLC 7.11 31 2.06 
FSLN 1.69 25 1.01 
El Salvador 
ARENA 8.05 24 1.09 
FMLN 2.28 22 1.4 
Guatemala 
PAN 6.92 13 0.95 
FRG 6.51 44 1.70 
URNG 1.25 4 0.50 
The averages are obtained based on a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. 
 
 
Table 14. Deputies‟ identification of opposing party‟s ideological position 
Political Party Average N Typ. Dev. 
Nicaragua 
PLC according to the FSLN 9.19 25 1.04 
FSLN according to the PLC 1.81 31 1.00 
El Salvador 
ARENA according to the FMLN 9.21 21 0.89 
FMLN according to ARENA 1.6 24 0.75 
Guatemala 
PAN according to the FRG 8.25 44 2.19 
PAN according to the URNG 9 4 1.41 
FRG according to the PAN 8.46 13 2.40 
FRG according to the URGN 9 4 1.41 
URGN according to the PAN 2.75 13 0.74 
URNG according to the FRG 2.47 43 1.45 
The averages are obtained based on a scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. 
 
According to the data, it seems clear that these are highly polarised party systems in 
ideological and symbolic terms. However, we cannot just accept this figure, since the 
replies regarding support for a democratic system (together with its institutions and 
policies) as analysed in other sections, suggest that it needs to be redefined.  In fact, 
although the party systems are ideologically polarised and lead us to expect potentially 
unstable political arenas, on the other hand it is also true that all of the groups evidently 
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agree on democratic institutions (polity) and policy. As a result, we would be well-
advised to conclude that over the 1990s, a noticeably complex and, to a certain extent, 
contradictory “elite” space has formed in the three countries.  Bearing this in mind, the 
question is: how can we qualify this type of elite articulation (or transformation)? 
 
There has certainly been a noticeable change in the opinions of the interviewees in 
comparison with those expressed two decades ago. These elites (whether they are the 
heads of former guerrilla groups or the leaders of the “formerly” reactionary right wing) 
agree, for the first time, that representative democracy is the best of all possible regimes 
and that its rules are acceptable. However, the differences increase when they evaluate 
the institutions and the political and social actors who participate in political life. Thus, 
despite agreement on the rules, good or bad relations with different actors and 
institutions involved in the political system make it clear that in the game there are very 
different (and unequal) groups of forces at play. In general, right-wing elites articulate a 
greater confidence in institutions and actors than left-wing elites (with natural 
divergences with regard to such traditional allies as business groups and trade unions).  
In this sense, we could state that the right is more comfortable in the playing field of 
representative democracy, with more allies and greater support. It has not been in vain 
that the right has consistently won all of the elections to the Presidency of the Republic 
that held in the region, with the exception of Daniel Ortega‟s “victory” in November 
20066. 
 
Focusing on opinions related to the relationship between state and market, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that in all three countries the capacity to develop economic 
policy has been the exclusive task of the right. Therefore, at the present time, only the 
right has had the opportunity to demonstrate its ability7 and, precisely for that reason, 
we can state that the policies generated have not changed the pernicious tendencies of 
exclusion and poverty of large groups; rather they have been accentuated. Therefore, the 
transformation of the right from profoundly reactionary and authoritarian positions to 
the adoption of civil behaviour and a role as defenders of liberal democracy and of the 
“free market” have not led to real changes within the realm of economic policy.  
 
In this sense, it is necessary to ask if those who define themselves as democrats within 
the right really are democrats, as sometimes the acceptance of “democracy” is not due 
to a change of values, but rather a strategic decision resulting from a realisation that a 
new political system allows actors to defend and promote their interests more 
comfortably then before (Font, 1998). The behaviour of the liberal opposition in 
Nicaragua after the return of the FSLN to power is a useful example of this. 
 
Meanwhile, on the other end of the political spectrum, it is necessary to note that the left 
has also undergone considerable transformations. One of the most surprising is the 
change of position with regard to the status quo. For, although the left justified the 
activation and continuity of the armed conflict for an entire decade on structural factors 
(such as the persistence of poverty, the unjust distribution of property or the perverse 
distribution of wealth), once the peace agreements were signed, their main concerns 
have centred on institutional aspects. Furthermore, the differences regarding the role 
that the State should have in the regulation of the market are noticeably more moderate 
than before and, in some cases, even concur with right-wing groups. 
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This type of transformation of the party elites, although it can offer some institutional 
stability (considering that they agree “on almost everything”) also presents some 
dangers, for it is necessary to ask what the future holds if the rights carries on winning 
in El Salvador and Guatemala or  if the FSLN continues with the economic policy of 
previous liberal administrations. Perhaps this dynamic could create increased apathy 
and mistrust towards institutions and elites on the part of the citizens, when they realise 
that despite the political pacts that opened up the political game at the beginning of the 
1990s, the new regimes have not led to substantial improvements in the situation of the 
majority of the population. 
 
However, within the puzzle that has been created so far in this paper, there is a piece 
that does not fit: if the elites agree on a democratic political game, accept institutions 
and agree on the policy to be implemented, how is it possible that they hold such an 
evident ideological distance among themselves? Is it just so that they can differentiate 
among themselves? Or is it so that the left can hang on to its revolutionary icons and 
symbols and so that the right can carry on admiring the North American government? 
Or is it a strategy to mobilise voters at certain times? 
  
There is no doubt that we should ask ourselves the reason for and the purpose of 
politicians in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua positioning themselves at 
ideological extremes. It is difficult to offer a convincing reply, but perhaps a clear 
ideological distance in certain political scenarios could be useful for all forces involved.  
Perhaps it is the only way of mobilising a progressively apathetic electorate and creating 
conflicts to keep public debate alive. 
 
In summary, if what has been demonstrated here is true, we should ask ourselves how 
far this mechanism of calculated tension can go, without leading to a crisis.  From a 
historical perspective (Higley and Gunther, 1992), the cases studied here are not 
exceptional since in other contexts this dynamic – when it is accompanied by a degree 
of economic growth and expectations of improvement on the part of the population – 
has created a slow but effective model of insertion. However, in the countries 
considered here it is difficult to predict what will be the result in the long term since, 
although the elites agree in accepting (and benefiting from) democratic institutions, 
most citizens have not obtained any substantial benefits from them. 
 
                                                 
1The opinions of the parliamentary elites are taken from interviews carried out by the Project 
“Representación Política y Calidad de la Democracia: un estudio de las élites parlamentarias de América 
Latina,” financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (ref SE C2002-3483) and directed 
by Prof Manuel Alcántara Sáez of the University of Salamanca. The number of parliamentarians 
interviewed in each party was calculated according to their relative weight within the national congress of 
their respective countries. The data from Nicaragua are from the 1997-2001 legislature; the data from El 
Salvador are from the 2000-2003 legislature; and the data from Guatemala are from the 1999-2003 
legislature. 
2 There are many different articles about the two “pacted peace processes”.   We recommend the analysis 
on El Salvador by Cardenal (2002); Martí‟s work on Nicaragua (1997) and the studies by IDEA (1998) 
and Sieder ed on Guatemala (1998). 
3 With regard to this aspect, it is necessary to point out various incidents recorded in all of the presidential 
elections in Nicaragua, particularly the chaos in 1996 (see the special report published in the journal 
Envío in November, 1996) and the permanent problems with censuses in El Salvador and Guatemala 
(Spence, 2004). 
4 92.3% of PAN‟s deputies, 59.1% of FRNG‟s deputies and 75% of the URNG‟s interviewees show a lot 
of confidence or quite a lot of confidence in the Catholic Church. 
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5 In another text by the same authors (Martí y Santiuste 2008) the paradox of the “moderation” of left-
wing political elites in Latin American is considered in depth.  In this context, the FSLN and the FMLN 
(a bit more to the left than its Nicaraguan counterpart) are not particularly radical. 
6 On the elections carried out in Nicaragua in November 2006 and Daniel Ortega winning the Presidency 
of the Republic see the article by Martí (2007). 
7 It is perhaps too early to draw conclusions about the policy implemented by Ortega‟s government in 
Nicaragua, however it is worth mentioning the analysis of the first year of the Sandinista adminstration by 
Martí (2008, in print).   
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